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Book Reviews
by Roscoe Pound. Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1940. Pp. ix, 322. $5.00.

ORGANIZATION OF COURTS,

Thirty-four years ago Roscoe Pound read before the American
Bar Association his first paper on organization of courts, entitled
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice." He argued that "our system of courts is archaic in
three respects: (1) in its multiplicity of courts, (2) in preserving
concurrent jurisdictions, (3) in the waste of judicial power which
it involves." In this same paper he "urged consideration of Lord
Selborne's plan, and advocated a single court, complete in itself,
of which the inferior courts, at one end, the courts of general
jurisdiction of first instance, and a single court of final appeal,
at the other end, were to be but branches or departments."1
During the following years Mr. Pound has elaborated this
idea persistently. In a long series of powerful and thought provoking articles and addresses he has done much to awaken the
legal profession to the weaknesses and defects of our almost planless systems of court organization. He has lived to see marked
progress in a few jurisdictions, notably in California, Massachusetts, Connecticut and in the federal courts. As Director of Research of the National Conference of Judicial Councils he continues to sound the same note, now made more effective by the
backing of an influential and nation-wide professional group. His
address at the meeting of this Conference in May, 1939, printed
in the Journal of the American Judicature Society for August of
that year, is as fresh and vigorous as if made by a youthful enthusiast for a brand-new idea.
This background of the author's interest is relevant in any
attempt to appraise his present book. For a generation he has
been a special pleader and in the concluding two chapters of the
book he frankly assumes that r6le. In these chapters he puts an
unerring finger upon the defects of the system as we received it
from the last century: hard and fast jurisdictional lines wasteful
of time and money of litigants and the public; rigidly fixed terms
of court; piecemeal handling of single controversies in different
courts; general lack of cooperation for want of any administrative head. He stresses particularly the deficiencies in the admin1. P. 273.
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istration of criminal justice, in the problems arising out of small
causes, and in juvenile and family relations cases. Finally, he
returns to a vigorous and convincing restatement of his plans for
reform proposed at the beginning of the present century.
Thus it seems fair to assume that this is a book with a purpose, that Mr. Pound intended it to be the capstone of a lifetime
of practical effort for reform. Measured by this standard, has he
succeeded? I think not. Argumentative exposition ought to be interesting and arresting, ought to be something you can put your
teeth into. This book, except for its last two chapters, represents
the very antithesis of these characteristics. In two hundred and
forty-six dull and tedious pages Mr. Pound traces the history of
court organization in England, in the American colonies, in the
federal and the forty-eight state courts during their formative
era before and after the Civil War, and so on down to the present
time. The ground he attempts to cover is enormous. He has exercised great skill in selecting and arranging historical data to
demonstrate that the haphazard lack of planned system in our
state courts has its roots in a similar stage of development in the
England of the eighteenth century that was our model.
"This is certainly a valuable contribution to legal history.
But
history
to
write
Pound
the very magnitude of his task has led Mr.
in its most unimpressive form. Turn at random to almost any
page of his first six long chapters, and you find so many dates and
details of legislation, so many bare bones of historical fact that
you feel as if you are reading a telephone book or a mail-order
catalogue. True, the author attempts, sometimes brilliantly, to
organize these data into a meaningful pattern at the end of each
chapter. But often the reader is so exhausted when he reaches
the synthesis that he is tempted to skip it. Moreover, again because of the mass of his material, Mr. Pound has been compelled
to exercise discriminative selection so rigidly that there seldom
emerges a complete picture of the present organization of the
courts in any specific jurisdiction. Thus, as history, the account is
singularly truncated, as argumentative exposition it is amazingly
dull.
Cardozo, it will be remembered, said in another connection
that "The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the
line of logical progression; this I will call the rule of analogy or
the method of philosophy; along the line of historical development; this I will call the method of evolution; along the line of
the customs of the community; this I will call the method of tra-
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dition; along the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, the
mores of the day; and this I will call the method of sociology."'
Mr. Pound has chosen to write the present book along the line of
historical development; he emphasizes the method of evolution.
From that standpoint he has done an important piece of work
and done it well though often in pedestrian fashion. But if I am
right in believing that he intended his book to be a tract, he
would have done better to use what Cardozo calls "the method
of sociology." An analytical table presenting graphically the
forms of court organization in half a dozen fairly typical states,
preceded by a very brief condensation of historical background,
and followed by factual and statistical analyses of the unhappy
results would be far more effective as argument.
This is not to say that Mr. Pound has written an unimportant
book. Probably no one is so well qualified to make a historical
study of this nature; certainly anyone who attempts to follow it
up by the method of sociology will draw heavily upon Mr. Pound's
learning and research as here recorded. The book will stand as
a monument to his industry and perseverance in the pursuit of
an ideal. Perhaps its greatest value will prove to be that it will
inspire another student and publicist with a characteristically
different method of approach to publish a more effective argument upholding Mr. Pound's original thesis.
JOSEPH

N.

ULMAN*

JURISTIc THEORY, by Roscoe Pound. Claremont
Colleges, Claremont, 1940. Pp. viii, 83. $1.50.

CONTEMPORARY

In this book Pound points to the rise of administrative tribunals with far reaching powers over the affairs of others, which
powers are little restrained and controlled by law; points also to
the modem juristic theory advanced by the realists that legal
rules and principles are a sort of judicial superstition, and that
judges really decide each case as they want to decide it without
much regard to rules and principles, except as a means of making
plausible what they have done; and then Pound holds that this
growth of law-free administrative tribunals plus the growth of
law-scorning juristic theory tend toward a new absolutism, in
2. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process

(1921)
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